Don’t pull up the drawbridge and EU Legitimacy
Writing for Euractive.com's 'The Brief', Benjamin Fox examines whether or not living and working in the UK is still an option for EU citizens.
The end of freedom of movement is one of the most iconic changes heralded by the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union last week. The days of EU nationals being able to able to move to the UK and find work on arrival are over. Many Europeans, particularly those from central and eastern member states, see this as a declaration of hostility against them.
But it is still far from clear what the new criteria will be for those who still want to live and work in the UK. The government has, thus far, proposed that only those with job offers for salaries of at least £30,000 (€36,000) per year will be allowed in, a threshold that would exclude the majority of EU migrants currently in the UK. Dreamt up by Theresa May’s government, for whom creating the ‘hostile environment’ was a personal project, the £30,000 threshold was always ludicrous.
For the sake of comparison, that is more than a newly trained doctor, teacher or nurse gets paid, and is comfortably higher than the average wage. It would also exclude entrepreneurs and those launching start-ups, who tend not to be offered a lucrative salary. Business leaders have waged a sustained lobbying campaign warning that the £30,000 threshold, combined with the government’s plans to introduce a ‘points-based’ immigration system, will leave thousands of firms across the UK struggling to attract enough workers. Public sector organisations, meanwhile, have repeatedly warned that the rules would also impose a huge strain on schools and hospitals. That campaign is now starting, albeit slowly, to bear fruit.
In a report published on Tuesday (28 January), the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), an independent body advising ministers, stated that the threshold should fall to £25,600 for all workers to help recruit teachers and skilled National Health Service staff. The committee’s chair also criticised the Conservative government’s much-touted points-based immigration system as a “soundbite”. For the moment, ministers are non-committal but it would be a surprise if they did not implement most of the MAC’s recommendations.
These are baby steps, but there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that the UK will not be pulling up the drawbridge. The target of reducing migration to the tens of thousands, introduced by David Cameron and actively supported by Theresa May, has been abandoned by Johnson’s government. The next thing to drop are rigid salary requirements.
Boris Johnson has always described himself as an internationalist. If his government’s promise of a ‘Global’ and ‘Open’ Britain is to mean anything, the offer to skilled and entrepreneurial Europeans to live and work in the UK must remain.
© Benjamin Fox/Euractive News
Yascha Mounk, writing for The Atlantic, raises questions over the EU's legitimacy
The European Union’s Double Crisis of Legitimacy
After two years of chaos and prevarication, the United Kingdom has finally left the European Union. Back in 2016, some observers predicted that Brexit would prove the frailty of the EU. The leaders of the remaining 27 European countries would be unable to find a common negotiating position. Big corporations—like the extremely powerful German carmakers—would put enormous pressure on leading politicians to cave to British demands. Brexit would be a great success and would quickly inspire other countries to follow suit.
Today, it is obvious that these predictions were wide of the mark. Throughout its negotiations with London, the EU has been remarkably unequivocal. If the CEOs of BMW and Volkswagen exerted any pressure on Angela Merkel, she evidently ignored it. And since the British political scene has not exactly been inspiring in recent years, the risk of imminent contagion seems to have subsided. Neither Greece nor Italy are about to leave the union. But if Brexit demonstrated Europe’s strength, the past few years have not done anything to solve a deeper problem that has little to do with its relationship to Great Britain: The union faces a double crisis of legitimacy.
The EU has enormous power. The European Central Bank governs the euro, and the European Council regulates European agriculture. Eurocrats decide what products can be made under what conditions, and European judges claim that they have the authority to override national laws.
Over the past decades, the internal structure of the EU has become a little more democratic. The European Parliament, for example, has greater powers now than it did in 1990. Even so, it is hard to sustain the fiction that ordinary citizens have a meaningful say over what happens in Brussels. Like in the constitutional monarchies of the 18th and 19th centuries, the mechanism for translating the views of the people into public policy remains extremely indirect.
In Germany, for example, citizens vote for a particular party in the national elections. The leaders of the country’s political parties then enter into a complicated process of negotiation to determine which parties will form the government and who the chancellor should be. That chancellor then appoints a number of ministers. Finally, these ministers go to Brussels a few times a year, where they and their peers from other EU member states pass legislation on the basis of proposals made by the unelected European Commission. In principle, the European Parliament is supposed to provide a democratic counterweight to the representatives of national governments who dominate the European Council and the bureaucrats who run the European Commission. The problem is that voters barely pay attention to what goes on in it.
If many voters don’t believe that they have much sway over what happens in their national capitals, the feeling of impotence is even more profound when it comes to Brussels. I don’t mean to suggest that the union confers no benefits. On their own, small countries like Sweden or even medium-size ones like Germany can hardly solve serious problems in areas like the environment. Many European citizens thus understand why they have to share their sovereignty with citizens of France or Greece. By being part of the European Union, their collective voice is that much louder.
But the extent of power that is now delegated to the EU also means that it makes a huge difference who’s actually sitting around the table in Brussels. And because of the rapid rise of authoritarian populism across Europe, German or Italian citizens don’t just share their sovereignty with the free citizens of other democratic states; they also share it with aspiring dictators in Warsaw and Budapest. Which brings me to the second crisis of legitimacy.
When strongmen like Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński first rose to power, European politicians assured the public that they would fail to concentrate power in their own hands. Because these countries were members of the EU, it was supposed to be impossible for them to experience a real decline in their democratic nature. In reality, the EU has, again and again, proved to be indifferent or ineffective in confronting authoritarians who won power in member states. Recent research by R. Daniel Kelemen and others even suggests that membership in the EU has made it easier for these strongmen to stay in power because it allows them to funnel European subsidies in areas like agriculture or infrastructure to their domestic allies.
At this late stage, there are still no serious plans for expelling countries that are no longer ruled in a democratic manner from membership in the EU. In fact, it is unlikely that their ability to vote in key institutions like the European Council will ever be suspended. European politicians can pretend not to recognise that this situation poses a fundamental threat to the democratic nature of the union. But it’s hard to predict how long European citizens will tolerate the status quo.
The Europe of today was, in large part, built by an impressive generation of dreamers and statesmen. In the first decades after the end of World War II, leaders like Konrad Adenauer and Jean Monnet reacted to immense challenges with great imagination. It is, in retrospect, difficult to fathom what courage it took for them to believe that the Germans and the French would one day be united in true friendship. Today’s European leaders still like to invoke the memory of their hallowed predecessors. But they have, unfortunately, taken the wrong lesson from them. Instead of aspiring to the same courage and imagination, they have come to think of the postwar order as a holy relic that must never be touched. Their motto has effectively become: Just keep doing what we have been doing for a long, long time.
That kind of immobilism can work temporarily. If most citizens believe that politicians will eventually solve the EU’s problems, they can tolerate a lot of dysfunction. But Eurocrats have, at this point, been drawing down on the store of trust they inherited for a while. The only way to rescue the European project is to forthrightly address the double problem of legitimacy.
The EU needs to make sure that the citizens of free countries will never have to share their sovereignty with the subjects of repressive dictatorships. This calls for a much tougher response to the authoritarian drift in many of its member states. Countries that violate the basic values on which the EU was founded need to lose their subsidies and their voting rights. If they don’t correct course, there has to be a workable mechanism for suspending their membership.
The EU also needs to fight against the democratic deficit that pervades its own institutions. In areas in which it makes sense for EU countries to share their sovereignty, the European Parliament needs to gain much greater power to shape decision making. Just as important, those policy areas in which decisions can just as easily be made at the national level need to revert to member states.
Europe’s founders succeeded in bringing peace and friendship to a continent long defined by enmity and warfare. All Europeans should feel an obligation to defend this achievement. But to do that, they first have to acknowledge, and then to remedy, the serious shortcomings now bedeviling the European Union.
© Yascha Mounk/The Atlantic